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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Much of the political rhetoric about healthcare in the United States is couched in terms of 
healthcare as a right or entitlement. Healthcare as a right, like all welfare rights, carries with it 
the obligation to pay for it. This paper proposes that healthcare be considered, not a right, but 
rather a duty within the framework of a Kantian approach to ethics. The categorical imperatives 
of rational beings include the duties of self-preservation and self-development. As a precondition 
for these duties, health is essentially bound up with the nature and duties of physical, rational 
beings. The complexity of healthcare ensures that virtually all persons will need the services of 
others, and the expense of healthcare can exceed the resources even of those who are insured. 
Therefore, a just society has a moral duty to ensure access to healthcare to all of its members. 
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Right or Duty: A Kantian Argument for Universal Healthcare 
 
by 
Joseph Crisp, D.Min. 
 
The question of universal healthcare brings with it the question of whether all people, 
simply by virtue of being human, have a right to healthcare.   Human rights are widely 
understood as either welfare rights or liberty rights.  Welfare rights are positive rights that 
require some action or expense on the part of someone to provide access to the right.   Liberty 
rights, by contrast, are rights that require nothing more of society or government than that it not 
interfere with the exercise of the right, as, for example, the right to free speech.   
The right to healthcare, if it exists, is clearly a welfare right, because simply guaranteeing 
by law that no one can interfere with one’s right to healthcare does nothing to actually provide 
healthcare.  A right to healthcare when one has no access to healthcare is essentially a 
meaningless right.  Conservatives who oppose “big government” are understandably cautious 
about the granting of welfare rights, because they always involve the question of who will pay 
for them.  I will argue in this paper that the work of the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel 
Kant offers a rationale for universal healthcare not based on rights, but rather on the moral 
obligation, or duty, of a society to arrange itself so that everyone has access to a reasonable level 
of healthcare.   
Kant’s classic work on ethics, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, attempts to 
define the ethical duties of rational beings.  In Kant’s philosophy, morality is derived, not from 
religion or tradition, but from pure rationality; and therefore, for Kant, moral agents are rational 
beings.  Among the duties of such beings, Kant distinguished between those that that bind 
hypothetically, and those that bind categorically.  Hypothetical duties are those that are required 
not for their own sake, but for the sake of something else.  Categorical duties, on the other hand, 
are those things that must be done, not in order to achieve or obtain something else, but for their 
own sake.   They are things that are done, as we would say today, because they are “the right 
thing to do.”  True moral duties are those that derive from categorical imperatives.    
Kant stated the categorical imperative in more than one way.  The two most well-known 
formulations are these:    
 
1. Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.   
2. Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end. 
 
Among the duties that are required categorically of a rational being, Kant argued, is a duty to 
oneself, both to preserve one’s life and to develop one’s abilities and talents.   Kant stated the 
first of these duties, the duty to preserve one’s life, in relation to the question of suicide.  He 
asked whether a rational being, so overcome by the misfortunes of life, had a duty to continue 
living, or whether he might take his own life.  His answer was that an action done out of self-
love that involved the destruction of the self, would be contradictory, and therefore, could not 
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possibly exist as a universal law.1   He further argued that, if one “destroys himself in order to 
flee from a burdensome condition, then he makes use of his person merely as a means, for the 
preservation of a bearable condition up to the end of life.”2  Both formulations of the categorical 
imperative, therefore, require the preservation of one’s life.   
Kant further argued that the duty to oneself requires, not only the preservation of one’s life, 
but also the utilization and development of one’s talents and capacities.  A rational being, Kant 
states, “necessarily wills that all the faculties in him should be developed because they are 
serviceable and given to him for all kinds of possible aims.”3  While one might choose to neglect 
one’s talents, one could not possibly will that such neglect could become a universal law of 
nature, because such neglect would at the same time be in conflict with humanity’s natural 
“dispositions to great perfection,”4 and would fail to further the “ends of nature” regarding the 
perfection of one’s talents.   
Rational beings, therefore, are morally obligated to (1) preserve themselves, and (2) develop 
their abilities and talents as far as they are able.  Health is the necessary precondition for the 
fulfillment of both of these duties; therefore, a rational being is obligated to preserve, protect, 
and care for his or her own health.   
At this point, it might be objected that healthcare is a hypothetical imperative, since it serves 
as a means to something else i. e., the preservation of one’s life, and the development of one’s 
talents.   However, in our world, rational beings are also physical beings, and our physical bodies 
may be considered as integral to our being.  The health of the body is so bound up with the 
nature and duties of rational beings, that one might say that to preserve one’s health is also to 
preserve and develop one’s being.  
While Kant’s philosophy deals with the duties of autonomous rational beings, he did not 
overlook the question of how such beings should live together in society.  In thinking of a larger 
community, Kant introduced the idea of a realm of ends.   A realm of ends is a “systematic 
combination of rational beings through communal objective laws.”5  Rational beings contain 
each of the other’s ends within themselves—that is, each being wills for the other what it would 
also will for itself, because an ethical will is universally legislative in nature.  
The “communal objective laws” in the realm of ends have as their aim the reference of these 
beings to one another as ends and means.  Laws are designed to promote the ends of each 
member of the community, and to never use them as a means to an end.  Since rational beings 
are categorically required to will for others what they would will for themselves, they must 
necessarily will the preservation of the lives and the development of the natural faculties of 
others.   Since health is a precondition for doing these duties, rational beings in community must 
necessarily will, and provide for, the health of others, as well as of themselves. 
Kant distinguished in the realm of ends between those things which have dignity, and those 
which have value, or price.  “What has a price is such that something else can also be put in its 
place as its equivalent; by contrast, that which is elevated above all price, and admits of no 
equivalent, has a dignity.”6   Things that have value are things that can be replaced by other 
things—material objects, goods, services, etc.  But rational beings have dignity, not value.  
                                                     
1 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2002), p. 38 
2 Ibid, p. 47 
3 Ibid, pp. 38-9 
4 Ibid, p. 48 
5 Ibid, p. 51 
6 Ibid, p. 52 
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Given the unity of health and being, it can be argued that health, and its preservation, falls into 
the category of those things that have dignity rather than value, and are beyond all price.  
Since health has dignity, rather than value, it cannot be treated as a market good.  It has no 
equivalent.  One might choose to buy an I-Phone, rather than a television set, or one might 
choose to buy neither.  But one has no choice but to fix a broken arm, or to undergo treatment for 
a life-threatening disease.    One cannot choose to buy a new car instead.   
It might be argued that healthcare is the responsibility of each person, not the responsibility 
of the society.   It is certainly true that each individual has an obligation to maintain his or her 
health.  However, in spite of one’s best efforts to maintain one’s health, everyone can be subject 
to illness or injury requiring a level of care which he or she cannot provide for him or herself, 
because they lack the knowledge and skill, and, if they are sick, they lack the ability.  They will 
necessarily require the services of some other person who has knowledge, skill, and sufficient 
health to provide for another.   Therefore, they must have access to the knowledge, skills, and 
ability of another, which requires that someone be available, and that someone pay for it.   
It might be argued at this point that everyone should be responsible to pay for their own 
healthcare, just as they would pay for any market good.   However, as noted above, healthcare in 
not a market good like others, subject to the normal laws of supply and demand.  Further, 
healthcare has become so complex and expensive that many people, and not just the poor, can be 
excluded.   Many lack health insurance, and some are underinsured.  Almost anyone could be 
vulnerable to a healthcare crisis that could drain all their resources.  In this sense, we are all 
behind what John Rawls called the “veil of ignorance,”7 in that no one can know when or if they 
will be confronted by a healthcare crisis that exceeds their ability to pay.  Here one thinks of 
Kant’s example of a person who, endowed with prosperity, chooses not to contribute toward the 
needs of others less fortunate.  While a society might subsist under such a principle, one could 
not possibly will that it could be a universal law, “for the case could sometime arise in which he 
needs the love and sympathetic participation of others, and where, through such a natural law 
arising from his own will, he would rob himself of all the hope of assistance that he wishes for 
himself.”8   
If healthcare is understood as an obligation so closely tied to the duties to preserve one’s life 
and develop one’s ability that it is in fact itself a categorical duty, and if in the realm of ends, 
every being necessarily wills that which is universally legislative, i. e., that which every other 
being would will for itself, then it follows that, members of a just society will seek to ensure that 
everyone has access to a sufficient level of healthcare to preserve their life and fulfill their 
greatest potential. 
The object of this paper has been to establish the moral obligation of a society to provide 
access to healthcare for all its members.  Healthcare is not a right or an entitlement, but a moral 
duty that touches all members of society.  It might be accomplished through a universal single 
payer system like Medicare, or it might be accomplished through some combination of 
government programs and market based approaches.  By however means, Kant’s approach to 
ethics can be said to require that a just society develop a system of universal healthcare that is 
accessible to all of its members. 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 1999), pp 118-23 
8 Kant, p. 40 
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